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 An Empirical Application of Laboratory
 Experimental Auctions in Marketing Research
 Dale J. Menkhaus, George W. Borden, Glen D. Whipple, Elizabeth Hoffman,
 and Ray A. Field
 A laboratory experimental auction was used to determine factors influencing the relative
 value consumers place on alternative retail beef packaging. Results indicate information
 is very important for the successful introduction and marketing of the vacuum skin
 package. Physical appearance of the beef plays a major role in purchasing decisions by
 consumers, with fat and shape significantly decreasing the value of beef in the vacuum
 skin package relative to beef in the overwrapped styrofoam tray package. Experimental
 economics procedures, when combined with traditional marketing research techniques,
 can provide useful information for marketing decisions and economic analyses.
 Key words: laboratory experimental auctions, marketing research, retail beef packaging.
 Introduction
 Agricultural economists are becoming increasingly involved in marketing research (e.g., Branson et al.;
 Skaggs et al.; Menkhaus et al.). This is due in part to the increased emphasis on marketing by commodity
 groups and to the keen competition among participants in the food industry. Moreover, changes in
 consumer attitudes and lifestyles have prompted researchers in food science and related disciplines to
 develop new products to meet these changing needs. This has provided an opportunity for agricultural
 economists to collaborate with their colleagues in food science and marketing to develop merchandising
 strategies that are consistent with consumer choice patterns.
 Marketing studies using traditional marketing research techniques (e.g., surveys, focus groups, test
 markets, and laboratory test markets) have focused on the collection of primary data to assess the consumer
 appeal of both new and existing products. While such data are useful in identifying consumer choice
 patterns and product quality attributes, the important issue of value has not been addressed. The economic
 value consumers place on new products and new product characteristics is important not only for deciding
 whether or not to produce a product for general sale and pricing, but also for determining if new products
 and product characteristics enhance consumers' perceptions of value.
 The overall purpose of this article is to demonstrate the empirical applicability of experimental eco-
 nomics techniques (specifically, laboratory experimental auctions) as an approach to eliciting value in-
 formation in marketing research. The specific objective was to determine factors influencing the value
 consumers place on retail beef steaks in a vacuum skin package (new product) relative to the value of
 steaks in the traditional overwrapped styrofoam tray. Results from this analysis can be useful in developing
 viable marketing strategies for new retail beef packaging. However, the focus of the article is directed
 more toward the application of laboratory experimental auctions rather than the specific results of the
 problem investigated.
 The Methodology
 In a laboratory experimental auction (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus; Coursey and Smith; Cox, Roberson,
 and Smith; Cox, Smith, and Walker; Forsythe and Isaac; Kagel, Harstad, and Levin), participants submit
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 bids for a product and the winners of the auction purchase the product at a price determined by the
 auction rules. This procedure allows participants to reveal to the researcher how much they are willing
 to pay for the product. A laboratory experimental auction, used in conjunction with survey instruments,
 has specific advantages over traditional marketing research techniques, particularly if determining eco-
 nomic value is important. The researcher can control variables under investigation, obtain data which
 are useful in analyzing demand, and obtain information pertaining to the economic value of a test product
 relative to a control product. For example, while a laboratory test market (LTM) procedure (Yankelovich,
 Skelly, and White) allows for control of variables in a laboratory setting, this method is less effective in
 eliciting the value consumers are willing to pay for a new product or product characteristic. Essentially,
 the LTM procedure employs list or posted pricing which, in the LTM setting, not only limits the number
 of price scenarios which can be examined, but also results only in a purchase or no-purchase decision at
 a particular price on the part of the test participant. The researcher learns that a participant will buy the
 test product at a price less than or equal to the list price, but does not learn the maximum amount the
 participant is willing to pay for the test product (the participant's demand price or reservation value).
 The use of laboratory experimental methods has become increasingly popular in microeconomic analyses
 (Hoffman and Spitzer; Smith 1 982; Wilde). Growth in the application of these techniques can be attributed
 to at least two properties of the experimental approach (Wilde): (a) control over the factors influencing
 the microeconomic system or the economic environment under investigation and (b) accurate measure-
 ment of relevant variables. This approach can be an equally effective and efficient method of obtaining
 data for an, as yet unobserved, economic phenomenon, such as a benchmark price for a new product.
 Auction Types
 The selection of the auction type to be used in an experiment is essential to the success of the experiment.
 In most economic experiments, the auction type selected should yield (or converge to) a stable market
 price and provide an incentive for the subject (consumer) to bid a price consistent with a true reservation
 value.1 An auction which satisfies the second property is referred to as a demand-revealing (or incentive-
 compatible) auction. However, in some applied research, meeting the stringent demand-revealing property
 may not be necessary. For example, if the objective is to compare values bid for test and control products,
 then all that may be required is that the auction mechanism provide an incentive to reveal the rank order
 of true reservation values, particularly if differences in bids from the true reservation value are similar
 for the two products. This might be referred to as a "rank-order revealing" property of an auction. Revenue
 generation is not a consideration for auction type selection in this study.
 In general, auctions have been used since ancient times (perhaps as early as 500 B.C.) as a mechanism
 to set price (Mester). A broad categorization includes oral and sealed-bid auctions. In a marketing research
 setting, sealed-bid auctions may be preferred to oral auctions because they facilitate data collection.
 Two common types of oral auctions are the English and the Dutch auctions. The former is characterized
 by the auctioneer raising prices until only one bidder remains, who wins the good at the price he/she bid.
 In the Dutch auction, the auctioneer continually lowers the price until stopped by a bidder, who then
 purchases the product at that price. In the Dutch tulip auction, for example, there is an automated clock
 which ticks down the price. Each bidder has a button which is used to stop the clock. The first bidder to
 push the button gets the object at the current clock price.
 There are two types of sealed-bid auctions which apply when there is a single seller of several units of
 a homogeneous commodity, without specification of a reservation price: a discriminatory (first-price)
 sealed-bid auction and a uniform-price (second-price or Vickrey) auction. In a discriminatory sealed-bid
 auction, the highest bidders win and pay what they bid. If a single unit is offered for sale, the highest
 bidder wins and pays the highest bid price. In the case of multiple units, each unit offered for sale would
 sell at each winner's bid price. Thus, each unit could sell at a different price. For example, if four units
 were offered for sale, they would sell at the four highest bids. In a uniform-price auction, on the other
 hand, the units all are sold at the same price (market price), which is equal to the highest rejected bid. In
 the case of a single unit, the highest bidder wins and pays the second-highest price. If four units of a
 commodity were offered for sale, the four highest bidders would win and pay the fifth-highest submitted
 bid.
 Economists have developed propositions from theory and experimental analyses to aid in predicting
 the ways bidders behave under different auction types (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus; Cox, Roberson, and
 Smith; Smith 1982). Theoretically, the expected utility-maximizing bid in the first-price sealed-bid auction
 and the Dutch auction is less than the bidder's true value for the auctioned object. Therefore, these auctions
 are not demand-revealing allocation mechanisms (Cox, Roberson, and Smith). In addition, the amount
 by which the object's value exceeds the optimal bid depends on the bidder's risk preferences and expec-
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 tations of rival bids. Since it is unlikely that risk preferences and expectations will be the same for each
 bidder, the highest bid will not necessarily be submitted by the subject who places the highest value on
 the auctioned good. Thus, the first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions may not be rank-order revealing.
 In an English auction, what the winning bidder pays is determined by the reservation value of the
 second-highest bidder. The individual with the highest reservation value should always be the highest
 bidder, since that person need only bid marginally more than the second-highest bidder to win the auction.
 Thus, the English auction is incentive-compatible and reveals the reservation value of each bidder who
 drops out of the auction. Only the reservation value of the highest bidder is not revealed.
 The second-price sealed-bid auction is isomorphic to the English auction and thus is also incentive-
 compatible (Vickrey). In the case of the second-price sealed-bid auction, the expected utility-maximizing
 bid is always equal to the bidder's true value for the auctioned good and is independent of the bidder's
 risk preferences and expectations. Bidding one's true value is a dominant strategy against any bidding
 strategy used by other bidders (Cox, Roberson, and Smith; Vickrey). In this sense, a second-price auction
 is theoretically a demand-revealing allocation or price setting mechanism. Moreover, it has been found
 by some researchers that subjects in experimental second-price auctions learn to bid their true values
 after a number of trial auctions (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus; Cox, Roberson, and Smith). This suggests
 that trial auctions are important so that participants can learn both the auction procedure and the optimal
 bidding strategy.
 Multiple-unit, uniform-price, first-rejected-bid auctions are also theoretically incentive-compatible or
 demand-revealing. These include third-price (two units sold at the third-highest price), fourth-price (three
 units sold at the fourth-highest price), and fifth-price (four units sold at the fifth-highest price) auctions.
 The important ingredients are that the winning bidders do not pay the prices they bid and that each
 winner purchases only one unit.2
 The conclusion that bidders generally learn to bid their true values in incentive-compatible auctions
 has been challenged by subsequent research. Coursey and Smith tested an auction in which four units of
 a fictitious commodity were sold to four different bidders at the fifth-highest bid price. They found that
 subjects consistently underbid relative to their true reservation values. This result suggests that the bids
 in such an auction should not be interpreted as true representations of subjects' maximum willingness to
 pay. However, differences in bids (or relative bids) across subjects and for different objects very well might
 represent real differences in value (Coursey and Smith). Coursey and Smith found that subjects tended
 to underbid by approximately the same amount, thus preserving the rank order of subject valuations.
 Thus, this auction type is rank-order revealing.
 The original second-price auctions were replicated by Cox, Smith, and Walker, and by Kagel, Harstad,
 and Levin. Cox, Smith, and Walker also replicated the fifth-price auctions. In both sets of replications,
 some subjects with relatively high reservation values bid more than their reservation values, while par-
 ticipants with low reservation values tended to bid less. In the fifth-price auctions, some high- valuation
 participants also bid less than their reservation values. These results lend further credence to the suggestion
 that bids in such auctions are rank-order revealing, rather than strictly demand revealing. Moreover, there
 is a need for additional study of the behavioral properties of theoretically incentive-compatible auctions
 and their use in applied research.
 In the study summarized below, a fifth-price auction was used to sell four packages of beef to four
 different consumers in each auction. A fifth-price auction (as compared to, e.g., a second-price auction)
 was chosen for several reasons. First, the intent was to sell enough packages of beef to maintain consumer
 interest in the auctions. Second, it was deemed necessary that the market prices (highest rejected bid) be
 low enough for high- valuation consumers to actually purchase several packages of steak at the same price.
 It was hypothesized that in a series of second-price auctions the market price would decline over time as
 consumers purchased each unit at close to the maximum price they were willing to pay.
 This point about the second-price auction as compared to the fifth-price auction is illustrated in table
 1, which presents the hypothetical demand schedules of packages of beef for five consumers. If the beef
 were sold in a series of second-price auctions and all consumers truthfully revealed their reservation values,
 the first unit would be purchased by consumer 2 for $7, the second unit would be purchased by consumer
 1 for $6.95, the third unit would be purchased by consumer 3 for $6.50, the fourth unit would be purchased
 by consumer 1 for $6.45, and so on. In contrast, if the beef were sold in a series of fifth-price auctions
 and all consumers truthfully revealed, consumers 1-4 would win each of the first four auctions and pay
 $4 per package in each auction. This results in a tendency for convergence to a relatively stable market
 price after only a few such auctions.
 In summary, the first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions theoretically are not demand-revealing and
 may not even be rank-order revealing. The English auction is demand-revealing (at least for participants
 other than the highest bidder) and is rank-order revealing. The second-price auction theoretically is
 demand-revealing, but behaviorally, this property has been challenged. However, this auction has been
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 Table 1. Hypothetical Consumer Demand Schedules for Packages
 of Beef
 Number
 of
 Pack-
 ages
 Pur- Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer Consumer
 chased 12 3 4 5
 1 $7.00 $7.25 $6.95 $6.25 $4.00
 2 6.50 6.25 6.45 6.00 3.50
 3 6.00 5.25 5.95 5.75 3.00
 4 5.50 4.25 5.45 5.50 2.50
 5 5.00 3.25 4.95 5.25 2.00
 6 4.50 2.25 4.45 5.00 1.50
 7 4.00 1.25 3.95 4.75 1.00
 shown to be rank-order revealing. Multiple-unit variants of this auction type (e.g., a fifth-price auction)
 have a tendency for convergence to a relatively stable market price after only a few auctions. Moreover,
 in a marketing research setting with real consumers, this auction type is more administratively appealing
 than the English auction. Thus, the fifth-price auction is a suitable auction mechanism for use in this
 study.
 While the retail meat market can be characterized as a posted-price market, the Vickrey auction was
 chosen over a posted-price mechanism. Given that the primary objective of this study was to elicit how
 much study participants were willing to pay for one unit of the test or control product in each bidding
 session, the Vickrey auction was deemed to be better suited to fulfilling this objective. Specifically, the
 Vickrey auction yields price or value information while a posted-price market provides quantity data at
 a finite number of potential prices. Moreover, the Vickrey auction is more operationally appealing as
 compared to the posted-price mechanism in that the researcher knows with certainty how much product
 will be sold, thus facilitating product procurement and preparation for the study. References detailing the
 posted-price market include: Buccola; Hoffman and Plott; Plott and Smith; Plott (1982, 1986); Smith
 (1964); and Williams.
 Empirical Application
 Economists have been studying changing meat consumption patterns for the last decade. The beef industry
 is most interested in identifying the factors responsible for the recent decline in demand for beef (Purcell).
 The industry has been affected greatly by this decline and is presented with the challenge of winning back
 market share. The marketing success of competing proteins- chicken, turkey, and seafood- has contrib-
 uted to the beef industry directing increased efforts towards marketing-related activities. These include
 advertising, promotional schemes, and new merchandising techniques.
 Beef packaging is an area which has received attention in the literature but has changed little at the
 retail level. Vacuum skin packaging is an alternative retail beef package being considered by the industry.
 According to Seidman, the advantages of the vacuum skin package include: (a) reduction in weight loss
 from evaporation and trimming, (b) preservation of meat color, (c) increased hygienic control, and (d)
 enhanced palatability due to controlled aging. Additional benefits for consumers are: (a) extended refrig-
 erator shelf life, (b) elimination of leakage of juices, (c) a clear view of entire piece of beef, and (d) better
 protection from freezer burn (Fielding). A disadvantage is that the meat in the vacuum skin package has
 an unusual purplish color rather than the familiar bright red color. However, when the package is opened
 and the meat reexposed to oxygen in the air, the color of the meat changes to bright red in about 15
 minutes.
 Research by Lynch, Kastner, and Kropf addressed the issue of consumer acceptance of the vacuum
 skin packaged beef. Results of this study suggest that informed consumers are more likely to indicate
 positive purchase intentions, while uninformed consumers are more apprehensive about purchasing the
 product.
 Since consumer acceptance is essential to the development of any new product, further consumer studies
 involving vacuum skin packaged retail cuts of beef are necessary to determine the marketing potential of
 this product. Past studies have considered purchase intentions by consumers as the basis for acceptance
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 of vacuum skin packaged retail cuts of beef. However, an issue yet unaddressed is the value consumers
 place on the vacuum skin package relative to the value they place on the traditional overwrapped styrofoam
 tray.
 Experiment Design and Procedures
 The experimental design used in the empirical application is presented below. The overwrapped styrofoam
 tray package is the control and the test is the vacuum skin package.
 Treatment
 w/o info Control
 Test Control (8 replications)
 w/info Control
 Test Control (8 replications)
 w/info + demo Control
 Test Control (8 replications)
 The study was conducted in Denver, Colorado (May 1989) and Los Angeles, California (August 1989).
 Approximately 384 individuals participated in the auction at each study site. Four monitors conducted
 simultaneous auction sessions (identical treatment and package order) four times per day for three days
 at each location.
 A branch of the same market research firm was commissioned to handle local arrangements and to
 recruit study participants in each location. The market research firm was instructed to provide a sample
 consistent with the population demographic characteristics of the area regarding age and income.
 Approximately three weeks prior to the study, the market research firm telephoned a sample of house-
 holds in either the Denver or Los Angeles area and administered a telephone screener survey. The screener
 was used to eliminate individuals working for a company involved in the sale or distribution of fresh
 meat and to get a representative sample by income and age for each session. One important criterion in
 the sample selection was to choose among those individuals who had purchased beef steak from a
 supermarket in the past month. This assured that the study participants were familiar with the value of
 beef steaks and that each had an underlying preference for steak. Moreover, the study participants were
 chosen such that each auction session had two males and six females. This allowed for an analysis of
 price differences across sexes. This mix was selected to ensure that every time slot had the same proportion
 of males and females since a higher percentage of women than men are the primary shoppers in their
 households and it is difficult to recruit men during the day.
 Respondents who passed the screening tests then were asked if they would be willing to participate in
 a market study in which they would be given $35 for participating and might have the opportunity actually
 to purchase steaks. Those who agreed to participate were sent a thank-you note and a reminder notice a
 few days prior to the study. Extra individuals were recruited for each session in case some people who
 had agreed to participate did not show up.
 The experiment was designed such that, to the extent possible, it duplicated the environment of the
 marketplace for retail beef. Study participants were provided the opportunity to inspect a display of Choice
 boneless, lip-off rib-eye steaks in overwrapped styrofoam trays and vacuum skin packages before partic-
 ipating in the auction. Each package contained two eight-ounce steaks and weighed one pound. Rib-eye
 steaks were used because they can be made relatively uniform with regard to seam fat, can be cut to
 provide for uniform package weight, and are highly valued. To assure that consumers were bidding for a
 homogeneous product and to maintain the incentive properties of the auction, representative steaks in
 each package type were chosen from the display case and used in the auctions. Study participants were
 given several opportunities during the auctions to closely examine the steaks and the two package types.
 Participants, in groups of eight, actually bid for the right to select steaks packaged in the overwrapped
 styrofoam tray and vacuum skin from the display case after the auctions were completed. For the purpose
 of control, and to assure that the prices bid for the steaks in the two package types could be compared,
 the steaks in the two package types were similar in size, amount of marbling, and distribution of seam
 fat. The lean color was different due to the packaging methods.3
 The multiple-unit Vickrey auction (previously discussed) was used to auction off four packages of each
 type during each of six purchase auctions (three auctions for each package type). The order of the packages
 auctioned was varied to control for sequencing effects. After the instructions explaining the specifics of
 the auction were read to the participants, four trial auctions (two for each package) were conducted prior
 to the purchase auctions. These were designed to acquaint participants with the auction procedures. The
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 auctions were conducted with varying levels of information pertaining to the vacuum skin package- no
 information, information specifically related to the advantages and characteristics of the vacuum package,
 and information with a demonstration of how the product blooms to the familiar bright red color after
 the vacuum package is opened. After a bid was submitted in a particular auction (four trial auctions and
 six purchase auctions) by each of the eight participants, the bids were ranked privately and the fifth-
 highest bid price (the market price) was reported by the auction monitor. The "winners" were those who
 submitted the top four bids. Each winner paid the fifth-highest bid, the first rejected bid price, for his/
 her package of steaks.
 All information other than the market price was kept strictly private and participants were instructed
 to count themselves as winners if they had bid more than the market price. Ties were decided by the roll
 of a die and any discrepancies between monitor records and participant records were deferred until the
 end of the experiment. During the trial auctions, the monitor checked each record sheet to make sure the
 participants understood how to determine when their bid was a winning bid and what was to be paid for
 a package of steaks. Few participants had difficulty with record keeping.
 At the conclusion of the series of trial and purchase auctions, participants who had bought steaks in
 any of the six purchase auctions paid for the steaks. The individuals were then given slips of paper which
 entitled them to pick up the steaks they had purchased from the display they had viewed prior to the
 auction. They selected vacuum skin and/or tray packaged steaks, depending on their auction purchases.
 A background questionnaire was completed by each participant prior to participating in the auctions.
 After the auctions, a post-auction questionnaire was administered. A post-use questionnaire was completed
 (by those purchasing the vacuum skin package) by means of telephone call-back after one to two weeks.
 The information from the questionnaires was used to obtain sensory information regarding package types,
 as well as to relate price level (individual bids) to selected demographic characteristics, meat purchase
 behavior, attitudes toward package type, etc.
 Model Development
 The model focuses on factors influencing the difference in bids for steaks between the two package types
 and demonstrates the potential use of data generated from laboratory experimental auctions in marketing
 and economic analyses. From a marketing perspective, it is useful to identify factors influencing the bids
 for beef in the alternative package types. Such information can be important in developing specific
 marketing strategies for the test product, vacuum skin (VS) packaging. Given that the bids obtained from
 the Vickrey auction cannot be viewed as behaviorally true reservation values, but are rank-order revealing,
 the analysis of bids obtained for each package type was conducted using relative (rather than absolute)
 bids. Accordingly, the dependent variable was defined as each study participant's average bid for beef in
 the VS package minus the average bid for beef in the overwrapped styrofoam tray (OST) package over a
 series of three auctions for each package type.
 Explanatory variables in the model were hypothesized to be classified into five categories: experimental
 variables, demographic characteristics, meat usage patterns, packaging, and related beef characteristics.
 With the exception of the experimental variables, which related to the specific manner in which the
 laboratory experiment was conducted, the remaining categories of variables were hypothesized to poten-
 tially influence consumer attitudes toward beef and retail beef packaging. This provided the motivation
 for including these variables in the background questionnaire administered before the auction, as well as
 in the model to explain the difference in bids for the steaks in the alternative package types. A discussion
 of the variables in each of the five categories identified above follows.
 The experimental variables were hypothesized to account for variation in the relative bids for beef in
 the two package types which might be due to the specific characteristics of the experiment. The experiment
 was designed to test the effects of information regarding the VS package on bids; order was varied to
 control for any sequencing effects. Moreover, there was interest in identifying the effects of location on
 relative bids for the package types. To some extent, this variable might pick up influences associated with
 differences in relative appeal of the package types in two different geographic regions. Finally, differences
 associated with the time of day the auction was conducted and the monitor were incorporated into the
 model. Time of day could be hypothesized to impact relative bids due to proximity to meal time (perhaps
 affecting the relative attractiveness of the two products) and the general temperament of participants
 during the course of the day. The experience of the monitors in conducting auction experiments, as well
 as their age and sex, also might be expected to have an influence on relative bids and thus merits testing.
 As compared to the no-information treatment, information treatments were expected to significantly
 increase the bids for the VS package relative to the OST package. If consumers move down their demand
 schedule as additional steaks are offered for sale in the auction, the order of presentation would be expected
 to increase the difference in bids for steaks in the VS package relative to steaks in the OST (since VS
 package first is coded 1). The specific experimental variables include: INFÌ = no information treatment
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 (base); INF2 = information provided about VS package treatment (1 if information, 0 otherwise); INF3
 = information provided about VS package plus demonstration treatment (1 if information + demon-
 stration, 0 otherwise); ORD = order in which OST and VS packages were offered in the three purchase
 auctions (1 if VS package first, 0 otherwise); LOC = location (1 if Los Angeles, 0 if Denver); TDÌ = time
 of day 1 (9:30 session, base); TD2 = time of day 2 (1 if 1:00 session, 0 otherwise); TD3 = time of day 3
 (1 if 3:30 Denver or 4:30 Los Angeles session, 0 otherwise); TD4 = time of day 4 (1 if 6:30 Denver or
 7:30 Los Angeles session, 0 otherwise); Ml = monitor 1 (1 if monitor 1, 0 otherwise); Ml = monitor 2
 (base monitor); M3 = monitor 3 (1 if monitor 3, 0 otherwise); and MA = monitor 4 (1 if monitor 4, 0
 otherwise).
 Differences in demographic factors, from an economic perspective, can influence the demands for one
 product over another. From a marketing perspective, understanding the appeal of a product among
 individuals with different demographic characteristics can be important in developing a marketing strategy
 directed toward a specific target market. Thus, selected demographic characteristics of study participants
 are included in the model to determine their influence on relative bids for the two package types. In
 general, it is difficult a priori to isolate the specific impacts of the demographic factors on the relative bids
 of the VS and OST packages. However, if the test product is considered superior to the control product,
 it might be expected that the difference in average bids would be directly related to income. Demographic
 variables include: AGE = age (continuous); INC = income (coded 1-1 1 with $10,000 increments); SEX
 = sex (1 if female, 0 if male); ED = education (coded 1-6, 1 if 8th grade or less, 2 if 1-3 years of high
 school, 3 if 4 years of high school, 4 if 1-3 years of college or technical school, 5 if 4 years of college, and
 6 if graduate work); NPH = number of persons in the household; MS = marital status (1 if married, 0
 otherwise); and ES = employment status (1 if employed full time, 0 otherwise).
 From the standpoint of beef merchandising, it would be useful to understand how new packaging appeals
 to individuals who recently may have reduced their beef purchases. For example, if individuals who have
 reduced their beef purchases tend to bid more for beef in the VS package relative to the OST package,
 then the new packaging would be a useful merchandising tool for the beef industry. Since poultry has
 been a recent strong competitor for beef, the relationship between changes in its purchasing patterns and
 the relative bids also would provide useful marketing information. Meat purchasing patterns incorporated
 into the model include: EBL = change in usage of fresh beef in past three years (1 if less often, 0 if same
 or more); and EPM = change in usage of poultry (chicken and turkey) in past three years (1 if more, 0 if
 same or less).
 The assumption of product homogeneity underlies many economic studies of value or price, particularly
 in time-series analyses. However, this particular study involves estimating the relative value of hetero-
 geneous products. In their study of product heterogeneity, Ladd and Suvannunt suggest a product char-
 acteristics approach. The most obvious characteristics which might influence relative bids of the VS and
 OST packages involve attributes which distinguish both the VS package from the OST package and
 between beef in the two package types. The distinguishing features of the VS package over the OST include:
 excellent freezer package, visibility of meat (which may relate to fat and marbling content), sturdiness,
 palatability due to controlled aging and less juice loss, environmental advantage as a result of not using
 styrofoam trays, the VS packaged meat exhibits a natural purplish color rather than the familiar bright
 red color, and the meat appears somewhat compressed.
 Variables chosen from the background questionnaire to reflect possible differences in bids between the
 VS and OST packages due to these characteristics include: OBP = opinion of beef packaging (1 if good,
 0 otherwise);4 FR = freeze fresh beef (1 if freeze for longer than one week after purchase, 0 otherwise);
 FT = fat trim (1 if not well trimmed/too much fat left on a concern, 0 if no concern);5 MAR = marbling
 (1 if greater amount of marbling encourages buying decision, 0 if discourages buying);6 PS = package
 sturdiness (1 if packages are not sturdy or strong is a concern, 0 if no concern);5 JVC = juiciness (1 if
 juicy/not dried out encourages buying decision, 0 if discourages buying);6 NAT = natural (relates to
 environmental advantage of VS package- 1 if labeled "all natural" encourages buying decision, 0 if
 discourages buying);6 BAA = beef appetizing and attractive (1 if beef looks appetizing and attractive
 encourages buying decision, 0 if discourages buying);6 and SHA = shape of beef in package (1 if overall
 shape encourages buying decision, 0 if discourages buying).6
 Those characteristics which were expected to contribute to increased bids for steaks in the VS package
 relative to bids for steaks in the OST include: freeze fresh beef, marbling, package sturdiness, juiciness,
 and naturalness. Other characteristics were hypothesized to reduce the bids for steaks in the VS package
 as compared to bids for the OST steaks, including: fat trim and shape of the beef. Fat trim, due to the
 visibility of the meat in the VS package and the contrast in color, may be detrimental to this package
 type. Finally, if consumers indicate a good overall opinion of the traditional beef package type, and if the
 bright red color of beef (beef appetizing and attractive) encourages the buying decision, each of these
 characteristics could be expected to be inversely related to the dependent variable.
 The model was estimated using ordinary least squares. The data for the dependent variable, average
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 bid for beef in the VS package minus the average bid for steaks in the OST package over a series of three
 purchase auctions for each package type, were obtained from the auction. The average difference in bids
 between steaks in the two package types was $.296. The data for the explanatory variables (other than
 the experimental variables) were obtained from the background questionnaire administered prior to the
 auction. Incomplete questionnaires and bid data from nonparticipating respondents were excluded, leaving
 a sample of 725 for model estimation.
 Results and Discussion
 Before estimating the model, correlation coefficients were calculated to determine whether any variables
 were pair- wise correlated. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, pair- wise correlations were found
 to be quite small. The highest pair-wise correlations occurred between the following variables: INF2,
 INF3 = -.52; NPH, MS = .44; EBL, EPM = .40; EBL, CHOLES = .26; CHOLES, CAL = .32; and
 EEL, CAL = .21. The magnitudes of these coefficients suggest the precision of the ordinary least squares
 estimator should not be impacted by close linear associations between independent variables. However,
 they do suggest interesting relationships. For example, as expected, individuals indicating that they have
 been eating beef less often have to some extent substituted poultry for beef. Finally, among the consumer
 segment that is eating beef less often, the health aspects oí beef (CHOLES and CAL) may be an issue for
 consideration by the beef industry.
 The estimated model is presented in table 2. Several experimental factors significantly affected the
 difference between average bids for the VS package of beef rib-eye steaks and the average bids for beef
 in the OST package. As expected, the level of information regarding the VS package significantly influenced
 the difference in average bids for steaks in the two package types [$.41 higher when information was
 provided (INF2) and $.48 higher when information and demonstration were provided (INF3), compared
 to the no-information treatment]. Relative bids with information alone were not significantly different
 from average relative bids in the information plus demonstration treatment. This suggests that information
 regarding the VS package enhances the value perception of beef in the VS package, but a demonstration
 of how the meat blooms to the familiar bright red color upon opening might not be warranted. However,
 this latter result should be considered cautiously, since consumers might not view information from a
 manufacturer to be as reliable as information given by university personnel.
 The order (ORD) in which the different package types were offered during the purchase auctions
 significantly influenced the difference in average bids for steaks between the VS and OST packages. When
 the VS package was offered first, the relative bid increased by nearly $.44 for the VS package. This result
 may have two possible interpretations: (a) subjects submitting winning bids when the VS package is offered
 first may adjust their bids downward as they become familiar with the market price, and (b) subjects may
 initially move down their demand curves as additional steaks are offered in the auctions. If explanation
 (a) is correct, subjects may be truthfully revealing their willingness to pay more than the market price but
 not their actual maximum willingness to pay. As the study participants willing to pay substantially more
 than the market price observe that they do not necessarily need to bid their true value in order to obtain
 steaks, they may shade their bids. Such behavior might stem from a psychological need to guard against
 bidding too much, even though the winning bids were not revealed and participants generally did not pay
 what they bid.
 Despite efforts to account for differences in the model due to demographics, meat purchase behavior,
 and general appeal of beef which might exist among consumers in the two study locations, location (LOC)
 had a significant effect on the relative bids. Los Angeles participants submitted, on average, bids which
 were about $.09 higher for the VS package relative to the OST package than Denver participants. Los
 Angeles participants may have been somewhat more acquainted with the VS package than Denver par-
 ticipants, since the VS packaged meat had been introduced into a few Los Angeles club merchandising
 outlets just prior to the study. In addition, differences in the general price level between the two locations
 may have contributed to differences in average relative bids for the two package types.
 The time of day the auction was conducted did not significantly influence the bids for the VS package
 relative to the OST package. As compared to the morning session, differences in average bids between
 the two package types during the early afternoon, late afternoon, and evening sessions were not significant,
 nor were they significant among sessions 2, 3, and 4 (TD2, 77)3, and TD4, respectively).
 Relative bids for monitors 1, 3, and 4 (Ml, M3, and M4) were not significantly different from relative
 bids received by monitor 2. There also was no significant difference in relative bids obtained by monitors
 1,3, and 4.
 Demographic characteristics of participants were not particularly important explanators of relative
 average bids. Income, number of people in the household, and employment status were the only demo-
 graphic factors which significantly influenced relative bids for the two package types; age, sex, education,
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 Table 2. Regression Results with Average Bid for the VS Package
 Minus the Average Bid for the OST Package as the Dependent
 Variable
 Regression Standard
 Independent Variable Coefficient Error
 Experimental Variables:
 INFl-Tri 2 (Information) .410*a .078
 INF3-Trt 3 (Info + Demo) .479*a .078
 ORD-Order .442* .067
 LOC-Location .090* .067
 rD2-Timeofday2 -.048b .093
 7Z>3-Timeofday3 -.016b .093
 rZ)4-Time of day 4 .075b .098
 Ml -Monitori -.056e .089
 M3-Monitor3 -.075e .089
 M4-Monitor4 -.099e .089
 Demographic Characteristics:
 AGE -Age .001 .003
 WC- Income .060* .021
 SEX-Sex .029 .079
 ^D-Education .008 .033
 NPH- Number of persons in household - .040* .026
 MS- Marital status - .048 .091
 ES- Employment status - .0 1 6* .076
 Meat Purchasing Patterns:
 EBL- Eating fresh beef less .068 .072
 EPM- Eating poultry more -.112* .079
 Package and Related Beef Characteristics:
 OBP-Opinion of fresh beef packaging - .035 .067
 FR - Freeze for later preparation .09 1 * .066
 FT- Not well trimmed/too much fat -.138* .069
 MAR- Greater amount of marbling -.084 .072
 PS- Packages are not sturdy or strong .091 .085
 JVC- Juicy/not dried out . 1 04 .1 09
 NAT- Labeled "all natural" .116* .073
 BAA - Beef looks appetizing and attractive .042 .108
 SHA-O'tr2'' shape -.127* .068
 Constant -.340 .294
 i?2 = .155
 * Indicates significance at a = .10.
a b e Indicates o sig ificant difference between pairs of coefficients in each
 category- information, time of day, and monitor, re pectively.
 and marital status were not significant influences. As income increased by $10,000, the difference in
 verage bids for beef in the VS package relative to average bids for b ef in the OST package increased
 by $.06. For participants employed full-tim , he difference in average bids betw en the two package types
was $.11 l wer, as compared to part-time and unemployed participants; as the numb r of eople in th
 household inc eased by on  member, he differe ce in bids decreased $.04. From a arketing perspective,
 these results sugg st that a reasonable target market for the VS p ckage is consumers with hi her incomes.
 Sp cialty meat and upscale stores might attract such a clientele.
An examination of the influences of me  usage patterns (beef, poultry) indicates that eating poultry
 mor  (EPM) sig ificantly decreas d the difference in average bids for the VS package of beef rib-eye steaks
relative to the average bids for e OST package ($.11). The vacuum skin package did not prompt
 significantly higher bids, as compared to the OST, among those individuals re orting eating beef less
often. These results suggest that the package alone might no  recapture those consumers who hav  reduced
 beef consumption in the three years rior to the study. Howev r, a change in packaging might be part of
a total product which would help the beef industry regain ma ket shar . The package i t provide a
 useful means of c anging the image of beef.
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 Several concerns (characteristics) related to beef and beef packaging expressed by study respondents
 significantly contributed to explaining relative bids. When not well-trimmed/too much fat left on (FT)
 was expressed as a concern, the difference in average bids for the VS package relative to the average bids
 for the OST package decreased by $.14. For consumers identifying shape of beef in the package (SHA)
 as encouraging the buying decision for steaks, the difference in average bids for the two package types
 was reduced by about $.13. The full visibility of beef in the VS package and the compressed nature of
 the product in the package type could explain these relationships. These results also suggest the importance
 of trim and overall fat content in retail beef merchandising, particularly for the VS package.
 When individuals indicated that they typically freeze meat for longer than one week after purchase
 (FR), the difference in average bids for the VS package of beef rib-eye steaks relative to the average bids
 for the OST package was significantly higher by $.09. The suitability of the VS package for use in freezing
 may provide an explanation for this result.
 When labeled "all natural" was identified as influencing steak buying decisions (NAT), the difference
 in average bids for the VS package of beef rib-eye steaks relative to the OST package was significantly
 larger by an average of $.12. Participants receiving information about the VS package (two-thirds of total
 sample) were told that quality beef has a "natural" burgundy color. Statements such as this may have
 contributed to a perception that the VS package of beef rib-eye steaks was somehow more "natural." In
 addition, environmental issues (such as whether the package is biodegradable) were commonly mentioned
 by participants concerned about the unsafe production and disposal of the traditional OST package type.
 Interestingly, coefficients associated with variables which were incorporated into the model to depict
 the advantages of the VS package, such as sturdy package (PS) and retains juices (JUC), were not significant.
 These advantages were specifically identified in the information treatments (INF2, INF3) of the experiment
 as part of the auction instructions. It may be that the latter variables masked the individual impacts of
 these product characteristics, even though there were no strong correlations between these product char-
 acteristics and the levels of information. Finally, coefficients associated with greater amount of marbling
 (MAR) and beef looks appetizing and attractive (BAA) exhibited unexpected signs but were not significantly
 different from zero.
 Implications
 Study results suggest that information is very important in the marketing of the vacuum skin package.
 When study participants received information about the VS package, they valued the beef in the VS
 package significantly higher as compared to the value when no information was provided. A demonstration
 of opening the VS package did not significantly increase the value of the VS package compared to the
 information treatment. This finding suggests a potential cost savings to retailers and the beef industry,
 since consumers only require information about the VS package. This result may have been affected
 somewhat by university personnel providing information rather than a retailer or processor.
 Physical appearance of the beef continues to play a major role in the purchasing decisions of consumers,
 with fat and shape significantly decreasing the value of beef in the VS package relative to beef in the OST
 package. These concerns become more important when considering the VS package, because consumers
 can see both sides of the meat. If the VS package is introduced, packers and retailers are faced with the
 need for increased quality control related to fat.
 Implications from this study regarding the value of the VS package relative to the OST package provide
 additional information about consumer attitudes pertaining to retail beef packaging. Study results suggest
 that the introduction of the VS package for retail beef appears to be warranted from the perspective of
 the consumer. However, the VS package should be introduced in conjunction with an information-oriented
 advertising campaign designed to encourage consumers to try the product. Whether the recent failure by
 Excel to introduce this package type in the market was due to the lack of an information-oriented marketing
 effort or to institutional barriers, such as retail meat cutters feeling threatened, is a subject for further
 investigation.
 Concluding Remarks
 An experimental economics procedure was used as the primary methodology in this study. While this
 procedure is not new, its use in marketing research is. Laboratory experimental auctions can allow
 researchers to elicit willingness to pay for a test product as well as provide a means to determine if unique
 characteristics of a test product enhance its value. The results obtained from this study suggest that the
 experimental economics procedure can provide information useful for marketing decisions and economic
 analyses, particularly when combined with traditional marketing research techniques. Finally, while a
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 laboratory experimental auction can provide a rich set of data for economic analyses, additional study is
 warranted pertaining to the behavioral properties of selected auction types and the use of this technique
 in applied research. The authors are in the process of studying properties of different auctions and their
 application to such problems as the effectiveness of alternative advertising campaigns on enhancing
 demand.
 [Received July 1991; final revision received November 1991.]
 Notes
 1 A bidder's reservation value can be determined in experiments by telling each participant that if he or she purchases
 a unit of a commodity, i.e., wins the auction, the experimenter will repurchase it for a stated reservation value. To
 mitigate the dependence of reservation values in a sequence of auctions, each subject may receive a new reservation
 value from a distribution of values in successive auctions. See Coppinger, Smith, and Titus, and Cox, Roberson, and
 Smith for details pertaining to this type of experiment.
 2 See Forsythe and Isaac for a discussion of why such an auction is not incentive-compatible if bidders can purchase
 more than one unit.
 3 Consistent with the terminology used in the industry, the package types were specifically identified as overwrapped
 styrofoam tray and vacuum skin package types. Since consumers, to some extent, may have been exposed to the
 industry terminology, specifically identifying package types facilitated response to questions related to consumer appeal
 of the packages and alleviated any order bias possibly associated with a generic alphabetic labeling of package types.
 4 Participants were asked to evaluate their overall opinion of how beef is packaged. Ratings were based on a five-
 point scale, where 5 = excellent, 4 = very good, 3 = good, 2 = fair, and 1 = poor. This variable was transformed by
 combining 3, 4, and 5 to reflect good (1), and 1 and 2 to reflect not good (0).
 5 In the background questionnaire, study participants were asked to identify characteristics of beef steaks which they
 did not like or about which they were concerned. This was a 0 (no concern) or 1 (concern) response.
 6 Participants were asked to rate on a nine-point scale (1 = strongly discourages from buying and 9 = strongly
 encourages buying) characteristics of beef steaks which were important in their buying decision. This variable was
 transformed by combining responses 7, 8, and 9 = encourages buying (1), and 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 = discourages buying
 (0).
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